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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff-Appellant Aurora Credit Sendees, Inc. ("Aurora") appeals the trial
court's November 10, 2004 entry of final judgment against it, and in favor of DefendantsAppellees Liberty West Development, Inc. ("Liberty West"), XM International ("XM")
and Dennis W. Gay ("Mr. Gay") (collectively, "Defendants"). The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REWEW
Defendants present the following statement of the issues and standards of review
to clarify and correct certain deficiencies in the corresponding sections of Aurora's brief.
1.

Did the trial court properly reject Aurora's claim that it was not required to

respond to Defendants' discovery because there was a minor typographical error in the
address to which they were mailed, where Aurora admitted it received the requests about
a week after they were mailed?
a.

Standard of Review. Aurora incorrectly states the standard of

appellate review on this issue as "correction of error, no deference." Brief of Appellant
(hereinafter, "Appellant's Br.") at 1 (citing Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d
271, 274 (Utah 1997)). To the contrary, appellate courts review the grant or denial of a
motion to compel for abuse of discretion. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, % 16, 30
P.3d 436; Nova Cos. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, % 6, 983 P.2d 575.
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that Aurora violated the court's April

8, 2003 Order by refusing to provide any responsive information to Defendants and, in

particular, by failing to produce at least two specific categories of information requested
by Defendants and ordered produced by the court?
a.

Standard of Review. Although Aurora identified the standard of

review on this issue as "correction of error, no deference/5 Appellant's Br. at 1, the
question of whether Aurora violated the April 8, 2003 Order is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, see Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 569 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that standard of review for trial court's finding that party violated discovery order
is abuse of discretion), and the factual findings underlying the determination are reviewed
for clear error. See United States v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc., 792 F.2d 906,
911 (9 Cir. 1986). "A district judge's determination that an order was not complied
with is entitled to considerable weight because the district judge is best equipped to judge
the circumstances of the noncompliance." Id.
3.

Did the trial court act within its broad discretion in sanctioning Aurora for

failure to comply with the court's April 8, 2003 Order?
a.

Standard of Review. Although Aurora has properly indicated that the

standard of review for a trial court's imposition of discovery sanctions is abuse of
discretion, see Morton, 938 P.2d at 274, it is important to note that the standard is
extremely deferential in cases involving the imposition of discovery sanctions:
"'Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the
discovery process, they are given broad discretion regarding the imposition
of discovery sanctions.'" Thus, we have long held that we will not interfere
unless '"abuse of that discretion [is] clearly shown.'" We will find that a
trial court has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to impose
only if there is either "an erroneous conclusion of law or . . . no evidentiary
basis for the trial court's ruling."

Id. at 274 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis and alterations in original).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Copies of Rules 5 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are included as
Exhibits "A" and "B" to the Addendum hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Aurora obtained a security interest in Liberty West stock owned by James Hogle,

Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), one of Liberty West's founders, in approximately late 1991. Aurora
obtained the security interest by purchasing a package of assets that included a pledge of
Mr. Hogle's stock as security for payment of a judgment in an unrelated matter. Aurora
did not purport to foreclose on its security interest in the Liberty West stock until April
1993.
On May 15, 1991, due to Liberty West's financial difficulties and inability to pay
its debts, a creditor of Liberty West held a foreclosure sale on Liberty West's primary
asset, which was an office complex located in Ogden, Utah (the "Ogden Property").
Despite the fact that Aurora held nothing but a security interest in the Liberty West stock
until 1993, which was nearly two years after the foreclosure sale on the Ogden Property,
Aurora thereafter developed a belief that the foreclosure sale was improper. In 1994,
Aurora filed suit against Liberty West, Mr. Gay and XM based upon alleged
improprieties in the sale.

This case has now been ongoing for nearly eleven years. It has been assigned to
three different trial court judges, has already been through one appeal, and has been
characterized by Aurora's refusal to honor the trial court's orders, including by refusing
to produce the discovery at issue in this appeal and by repeatedly refusing to take "no"
for an answer. Indeed, after nearly ever unfavorable ruling, Aurora engaged in
distracting and dilatory tactics, all of which were designed to take second bites at the
proverbial apple. For example, Aurora filed at least two "motions to alter and amend"
orders entered by the court, a number of "objections" to proposed orders, and numerous
similar filings.
It is against this eleven-year backdrop of contumacious conduct by Aurora that the
trial court's dismissal of the action must be viewed. Utah courts have repeatedly
recognized that trial court judges are in the best position to evaluate the discovery process
as well as the appropriate sanction for abuse of the process. As a result, their decisions
regarding discovery, including the imposition of sanctions, are reviewed with a high level
of deference. In this case, for example, it is clear that no abuse of discretion occurred.
The trial court properly granted Defendants' motion to compel, and then properly
concluded that Aurora violated the court's order on the subject.
The trial court also acted within its discretion by sanctioning Aurora for its willful
refusal to produce certain critical information, including but not limited to information
sufficient to identify Aurora's poorly-defmed claims and copies of notes taken by
Aurora's president that Aurora first promised to produce on January 23, 2001—several
years before the trial court decided it need not wait any longer. The relevance of the

initial category of documents is obvious. To defend against Aurora's claims, Defendants
were obviously entitled to have Aurora identify the claims and the evidence supporting
the claims.
The second category of documents was at least equally critical especially in light
of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in the first appeal of this matter. See Aurora Credit
Sews., Inc. v. Liberty West Dew, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) {"Aurora F). In
Aurora 7 the Supreme Court held that the only way in which Aurora could have standing
to maintain either its direct or derivative claims was under a narrow exception to the
contemporaneous stock-ownership rule. More specifically, because Aurora was not a
shareholder of Liberty West when the Ogden Property was sold, Aurora must establish
that it fell within the fraudulent concealment exception to the rule. Aurora's primary
allegation supporting its claim to this exception is that Defendants purportedly told
Aurora that they were attempting to sell the Odgen Property, which allegedly was no
longer true after May of 1991. Id. at 1279-80. Accordingly, the contemporaneous notes
made by Aurora's president, reflecting statements made to Aurora by Defendants and/or
related parties, were extremely relevant, and in fact may have been the only documentary
evidence to support Aurora's claim of fraudulent concealment. As recognized by the trial
court, Defendants' ability to put on a defense was seriously hampered by Aurora's willful
and repeated refusal to produce this information, which was in flagrant violation of the
trial court's order. For these and other reasons discussed herein, the trial court's
judgment should be affirmed.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
A.

The First Dismissal

Aurora filed suit against Defendants in August 1994, asserting both direct claims
and derivative claims on behalf of Liberty West's shareholders. See R. at 1. Defendants
promptly responded with a Motion to Dismiss, based primarily upon Aurora's lack of
standing to assert direct claims against Liberty West and Mr. Gay. See R. at 13-14. The
trial court granted Defendants' motion in part, dismissing Counts III through VTI1 of the
complaint to the extent they asserted direct claims by Aurora against Liberty West and
Mr. Gay. See R. at 139. As the court explained in a subsequent order, in response to
Aurora's submission of its "Request for Findings and to Amend Judgment or
Complaint,"2 Aurora could not maintain certain claims directly against Liberty West and
Mr. Gay because the alleged injury was to Liberty West, not to Aurora, and the claims
therefore belonged to the corporation. See R. at 171-174.
On July 31, 1995, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on Aurora's
alleged derivative claims. See R. at 219. Defendants argued that Aurora lacked standing
to maintain the claims based upon the well established "contemporary ownership rule,"
which provides that a shareholder cannot maintain a derivative action on behalf of a
corporation unless the shareholder owned stock in the corporation at the time of the
alleged injury. See R. at 234-240. On December 22, 1995, the trial court granted the
1

Counts III through VII alleged mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duty and similar,
but largely unspecified, claims.
" This is just the first of many instances in which Aurora refused to accept a ruling from
the trail court.

summary judgment motion and dismissed Counts III through VII of Aurora's First
Amended Complaint to the extent they asserted derivative claims on behalf of Liberty
West. See R. at 234-40. Aurora again moved to alter or amend the court's summary
judgment ruling, and to amend its complaint, but the trial court denied these motions. See
R. at 414.
B.

The First Appeal

Aurora appealed the dismissal of its direct claims and the summary judgment on
its derivative claims following the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification. See R. at 462-65.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting
Defendants' motion partial summary judgment on Aurora's derivative claims and in
dismissing Aurora's direct claims. See Aurora /, 970 P.2d at 1282. The court also held
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Aurora's motion to amend its
complaint. See id. With respect to the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the
derivative claims, the Utah Supreme Court held that, although Aurora lacked standing to
bring the derivative claims under the traditional contemporaneous ownership doctrine,
there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Aurora had standing by virtue of
the "fraudulent concealment exception" to the doctrine. See id. at 1279. Due to the
factual nature of this inquiry, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court
to determine the applicability of the exception. See id. Because Aurora would only have
standing if the fraudulent concealment exception were satisfied, documents and evidence
regarding Defendants' representations to Aurora at and after the time when Aurora claims
to have become a shareholder of Liberty West became critically important to the case.

With respect to Aurora's direct claims, the court held that minority shareholders of
closely held corporations may proceed directly against corporate officers where the
shareholder suffered an injury "distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. at
1280. However, the court went on to hold that, just as with derivative actions, the
minority shareholder must meet the contemporaneous ownership standard of Rule 23.1.
See id. at 1280-81. Accordingly, the question on remand was the same as the one for the
derivative claims, namely, whether Aurora would be permitted to bring its direct claims
based upon the fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership
rule.3 See id. at 1281. Again, documents and evidence on this point became critical.
C.

Remand to the Trial Court

Following the issuance of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, the parties
recommenced their discovery efforts, see, e.g., R. at 674, 696, 868. In addition,
Defendants filed a motion requesting a separate trial on the issue of standing. See R. at
768. The basis for this motion was that, since the Utah Supreme Court had remanded on
the issue of standing, that issue should be resolved separately, and first, because if
resolved in favor of Defendants, a full-blown trial on the merits would not be required.
SeeR. at 771-72.
On November 30, 1999, the court granted Aurora's motion to amend its
complaint. R. at 811-812. By the same Order, the trial court continued Defendants'
motion for a separate trial "until such time as the court is more fully advised through
3

The court also ruled that the trial court's denial of Aurora's motion to amend its
complaint was a basis for reversal, as the trial court had failed adequately to explain its
reasoning for denying the motion. See R. at 1282.

plaintiffs amended complaint, defendant's answer, and discovery conducted by the
parties as to the propriety of separate trials in this case." R. at 812 (emphasis added).
Aurora filed its Second Amended Complaint on March 21, 2000, which added three new
causes of action against Defendants. See R. at 846.
On October 19, 2001, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, this time
on the basis that Aurora had not met its burden to establish the fraudulent concealment
exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See R. at 1140. The court denied the
motion by Memorandum Decision and Order on August 1, 2002, emphasizing that there
were questions of fact "whether 'affirmative steps to conceal wrongdoing' from [Aurora]
were undertaken'1 between April 1993, when Aurora claims to have foreclosed on its
interest in Liberty West stock, and July 1993, when Aurora learned of the foreclosure
sale.4 See R. at 1304, 1306.
1.

TJie Second Set of Requests

On December 4, 2002, in accordance with the court's denial of then motion for
summary judgment, and shortly after Defendants obtained new counsel, Defendants
served a second set of discovery requests on Aurora, which consisted of requests for
production of documents and interrogatories (the "Second Set of Requests"). See R. at
1384. Among other documents and information, the Second Set of Requests formally
sought certain information that Aurora's counsel had previously promised but failed to
provide to Defendants. Specifically, the Second Set of Requests sought (1) Mr. Zak's

4

A copy of the trial court's August 1, 2002 Order is attached as Exhibit "C" to the
Addendum hereto.

handwritten notes of conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which Mi". Zak explicitly
stated were in existence and his counsel promised to produce, albeit in redacted form, at
Mr. Zak's deposition on January 23, 2001, see R. at 1481, 1519, 1532-33; (2) a complete
copy of Aurora's first set of document production, which Aurora's counsel had also
agreed to provide, see R. at 1480-81, 1519; and (3) an explanation of Aurora's claims,
including identification and clarification of each of the claims, and evidence supporting
them, which Aurora also had previously promised to provide. See R. at 1481, 1507-08.
Incredibly, even though Aurora's counsel agreed in these telephone conversations to
produce the documents and information requested by Defendants, Aurora refused to do
so, forcing the motions to compel.
Defendants served the Second Set of Requests by mail on Aurora's counsel at
2258 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109. See R. at 1383, 1385. As
Defendants later discovered, this address contained a single-digit typographical error—
the correct address is apparently 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84109. Despite the error in the address, however, Aurora's counsel admitted that he
received the Second Set of Requests about one week after they were mailed to him, or by
approximately December 11, 2003. See R. at 1569. Aurora's responses to the Second
Set of Requests were therefore due on January 6, 2003. See R. at 1478.
Defendants heard nothing from Aurora regarding the Second Set of Requests until
January 10, 2003—four days after the Aurora's responses were due—when counsel for
Aurora informed Defendants' counsel by telephone that Aurora did not intend to respond
to the Second Set of Requests at all. See R. at 1478, 1524. Aurora's counsel stated that

he would be moving to strike the Second Set of Requests because a prior court order
precluded Defendants from conducting further discovery. See id.
2.

Hie Motion to Compel

On January 14, 2003, having received no response to the Second Set of Requests,
Defendants moved to compel. See R. at 1534. As Defendants explained in the
memorandum supporting the motion, Aurora not only refused to respond to the Second
Set of Requests but also failed to file any objection to the requests and failed to move for
a protective order. See R. at 1476. Instead, on January 16, 2003, ten days after the
responses were due, Aurora filed a motion to strike the Second Set of Requests. Aurora
argued that a prior court order prohibited Defendants from conducting additional
discovery and that Defendants' decision to propound the requests was contrary to prior
representations made in the litigation. See R. at 1539. Aurora did not make any mention
of, or otherwise refer to the sendee of, the Second Set of Requests in its motion to strike.
In fact, Aurora did not file its opposition to the motion to compel until January 27, 2003,
when it raised for the first time its argument that it was not required to respond to the
Second Set of Requests because it was mailed to the wrong address. See R. at 1574.
The trial court held a hearing on the pending motions, including Defendants'
motion to compel and Aurora's motion to strike, on March 26, 2003, which was more
than tliree months after the Second Set of Requests was served. See R. at 3347. Among
other things, the court considered and rejected the argument that the Second Set of
Requests had been improperly served, stating, "Well, I understand that. I don't need to
hear that." R. at 3347, p. 32. The court further ruled as follows:

Here's what I'm going to do in this matter. I am going to allow
additional discovery by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs. I'm
also going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All discovery
in this case will be completed sixty days from today's date. Operative word
is completed, gentlemen. This case is almost as old as my children.
R. at 3347, pp. 33-34.
Defendants subsequently submitted a proposed order on the motions, and Aurora
characteristically took the opportunity to re-argue its positions by objecting to the "form"
of the order. In reality, Aurora's objection was to the order's substance, not its form.
Among other things, Aurora claimed that the court did not grant Defendant's motion to
compel but instead simply stated that it would "allow additional discovery by
defendants." R. at 1713-14.
The trial court rejected Aurora's objections and entered Defendants' proposed
order, with certain minor changes, on April 8, 2003.3 The April 8 Order provided, in
relevant part, as follows:
Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to
Strike is DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Sendees, Inc. will respond to
Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants'
Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, within thirty (30)
days from April 18, 2003.
R. at 1751. Although the original proposed order submitted by Defendants stated that
Aurora must respond to the Second Set of Requests within thirty7 days from March 26,
2003, the court scratched out that date and replaced it with April 18, 2003, thus giving
Aurora about three additional weeks to respond to the discovery requests. See R. at 1751.

D

A copy of the April 8, 2003 Order is attached as Exhibit "I)" to the Addendum hereto.

The court also imposed a deadline for the completion of all discovery in the case for sixty
days from March 26, 2003. See R. at 1752.6
Despite the fact that Aurora still had over two weeks in which to comply with the
April 8 Order by responding to the Second Set of Requests. Aurora proceeded to file a
flurry of motions and other papers. On May 5. 2003, Aurora moved the court to appoint
a special master to deal with the discover}7 issues in the case. See R. at 1790. On May 7,
2003, Aurora served what it claimed were its responses to the Second Set of Requests on
Defendants. See R. at 1794-95. These "responses," however, provided extremely little
information in response to Defendants' interrogatories and refused to produce any
documents at all. See R. at 1936-1954. On May 12, 2003, Aurora moved for a protective
order to delay the deposition of Aurora's President, Charles F. Zak ("Mr. Zak"), which
was then noticed for May 15, 2003. See R. at 1798. On the same day, Aurora filed a
document entitled "Motion to Toll Discovery Deadline for Period of Special Master's
Review of Discovery Issues and Request for Immediate Hearing," R. at 1803, asking the
trail court to extend the sixty-day discovery period.
3.

The Motion for Sanctions

On May 22, 2003, having received only Aurora's "responses" to the Second Set of
Requests but not havmg received a single document requested therein, Defendants filed a
motion requesting the imposition of Rule 37 sanctions. See R. at 1809. Defendants'

6

So there would be no confusion on the issue of sendee, Defendants re-served their
Second Set of Requests on April 2, 2003, shortly after the trial court's oral ruling on the
motion to compel at the March 26, 2003 hearing. See R. at 1730-31.

motion explained that the court's April 8, 2003 Order did not merely require the sendee
of a written response to the Second Set of Requests, but that the Order required Aurora to
actually produce certain categories of documents, including (1) Mr. Zak's handwritten
notes of conversations with Mr. Gay and others following Aurora's purported foreclosure
on its interest in Liberty West stock; (2) a complete copy of Aurora's first set of
document production; and (3) an explanation of Aurora's claims, including identification
and clarification of each of the claims and the bases for the claims. See R. at 1915.
Defendants filed two additional motions on May 22, 2003, including a Motion to
Dismiss Aurora's third, fourth, and sixth through tenth claims for relief, see R. at 1844,
and a Motion for Summary Judgment. See R. at 1866. As discussed below, however,
these motions were ultimately rendered moot by virtue of the court's ruling on the motion
for Rule 37 sanctions.
The hearing on the motion for sanctions did not occur until May 5, 2004, and,
although the briefing on each of Defendants' May 22, 2003 motions was finally
completed by February 6, 2004, see R. at 2134, Aurora failed to take advantage of the
interim period. Instead producing the requested documents, moving for an extension of
time, providing a privilege Jog, or moving for a protective order, for example, Aurora
filed yet another round of motions, including a forty-five page motion to strike an
affidavit, see R. at 2389, and a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of

Aurora's motion to strike the affidavit of Mary E. Anderson provides a further example
of Aurora's persistent disrespect for the trial court's orders. As mentioned, Aurora's
memorandum in support of this motion was forty-five pages long. Although Aurora filed
a motion for leave to submit an overlength memorandum, see R. at 2383, the trial court

standing and liability for "various claims of plaintiff herein." R. at 2551. Following the
hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

See R. at 2380.

On June 10, 2004, the court issued a minute entry explaining its ruling on the
motions addressed at the May 5, 2004, hearing.9 See R. at 3261. Specifically, the trial
court imposed two sanctions on Aurora for failing to comply with its Order and
Defendants1 discover}7 requests. First, Aurora would be precluded from using or relying
upon any testimony related to the alleged conversations between Mr. Zak and Mr. Gay.
See R. at 3261-62. Second, the court dismissed Aurora's Second Amended Complaint,
stating that Aurora had failed "to identify its claims and evidence in support thereof." R.
at 3262.
The minute entry explained the basis for the court's rulings as follows:
On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its
Order, the court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora to respond to
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff has failed to do so. To this day.
granted the motion only in part, permitting Aurora to file a memorandum of twenty-five
pages in length. See R. at 2462. Rather than comply with this directive, Aurora simply
re-filed the first nineteen pages of its original memorandum, with the remaining eighteen
or so pages attached as an addendum thereto. See R. at 2493-2529. Interestingly, the
pages of the Addendum were unnumbered. The trial court indicated its frustration with
this trickery at the subsequent hearing. See R. at 3348, pp. 3-4.
After the May 5 hearing, Aurora filed another motion for summary judgment and
memorandum in support thereof, see R. at 2965, as well as yet another memorandum in
support of its prior motion to strike. See R. at 2968.
9

A copy of the June 10, 2004 minute entry is included as Exhibit "E" to the Addendum
hereto.

Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to
provide defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its
defense of this case: the handwritten notes of Charles Zak regarding
conversations with James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson,
relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a former
employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged.
R. at 3261 (emphasis added). Addressing the argument that Aurora adequately responded
to the Second Set of Requests by filing its "response" thereto on May 7, 2003, the court
stated:
While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants
with "written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate.
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation
imperative to defendants' defense.
R. at 3261, n.l. An Order reflecting the findings and conclusions set forth in the minute
entry was entered on July 13, 2004.10 R. at 3276.
In typical fashion, Aurora filed yet another motion to "alter or amend" following
the entry of the July 13, 2004 Order. See R.3280. On November 10, 2004, after the
motion had been fully briefed by the parties, the trial court denied Aurora's motion.11
See R. at 3328-29. Aurora filed its notice of appeal on December 9, 2004. See R. at

HI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the nature of the issues on appeal is procedural, the facts underlying the

litigation are largely immaterial to this appeal. The following discussion nevertheless
provides a sketch of the case's factual background.
10

A copy of the July 13, 2004 Order is included as Exhibit "F" to the Addendum hereto.
A copy of November 10, 2004 Order is attached as Exhibit "G" to the Addendum
hereto.
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Mr. Gay, James Hogle Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), and two other individuals formed
Liberty West in 1986 for the purpose of developing commercial real estate. See R. at
1156 % 3. Liberty West borrowed money to develop an office building in Ogden, Utah
(the "Ogden Property"), which was secured by a note and mortgage on the property. See
R. at 1156fflj4-5. After construction was completed, the Ogden Property was leased to
the Internal Revenue Sendee (the "IRS"). See R. at 222 % 5.
Despite the IRS lease, by 1989, Liberty West was having financial difficulties,
including being unable to make the payments due on its loan for the Ogden Property, and
numerous creditors had placed liens against the Ogden Property. See R. at 1156 f 7. In
early 1991, a creditor of Liberty West named Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply
Company, Inc. ("Pvestauranr Store") sued Liberty West for nonpayment on a contract and
obtained a monetary judgment against it. See R. at 1157 H 11. Restaurant Store
subsequently obtained a Writ of Execution and, on April 24, 1991, the Weber County
Sheriff recorded a lew on the Ogden Property with the Weber County Recorder's Office.
SeeR. at 1157-584 11.
On May 15, 1991, the Weber County7 Sheriff conducted a sheriffs sale of the
Ogden Property pursuant to Restaurant Store's Writ of Execution. Restaurant Store was
the highest bidder at the sale and, in fact, the only bidder to appear. See R. at 1157-57,
U l l . The Weber County Sheriff therefore issued a certificate of the sale to Restaurant
Store, which was recorded with the Weber County Recorder on June 3, 1993. R. at 114445 % 6; R a t 1168.

Liberty West's six-month redemption period for the Ogden Property expired on
November 15, 1991. R. at 290 ^f 3. Due to ongoing losses and the shareholders' desire
not to put more money into the enterprise, Liberty West's shareholders ultimately
determined not to redeem the Ogden Property. Among other factors affecting this
decision was the discovery of a major underground petroleum contamination from a
neighboring manufacturing plant. R. at 1158 % 15.
On May 20, 1991, XM, which at the time was a general partnership owned jointly
by Mr. Gay and an individual named George Bybee, who was not an owner of Liberty
West, purchased the Ogden Property from Restaurant Store. R. at 1158 % 12. XM has
been the equitable and beneficial owner of the Property since May 20, 1991. See R. at
115% ^ 12; see also R. at 29-30.
Aurora did not obtain any interest in Liberty West until late 1991, at which point it
acquired only a security interest in Liberty West stock then-owned by Mr. Hogle. In the
late 1980s, Mr. Hogle had been sued in another state for an unrelated debt owed to Union
National Bank of Chicago ("UNBC"), which obtained a monetary judgment against him
(the "Hogle Judgment"). R. at 1157 If 8. UNBC's assets, including the Hogle Judgment,
were subsequently assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). R.
at 1157 Tf 8. On February 20, 1991, Mr. Hogle executed a security agreement in favor of
the FDIC, in which he pledged his 2,500 shares of Liberty West stock as collateral for the
judgment. See R. at 1157, 2137. On November 21, 1990, Mr. Gay, then-president of
Liberty West, sent the unendorsed stock certificates owned by Mr. Hogle to the FDIC

together with another document signed by Mr. Hogle entitled "Irrevocable Stock or Bond
Power/' confirming the FDIC's security interest in the Hogle Shares. See R. at 1157 ^f 9.
On November 22, 1991. Aurora, whose primary business is acquiring assets from
the FDIC, the Resolution Trust Corporation and other financial institutions for collection,
see R. at 356, purchased a package of assets, which included the Hogle Judgment, from
the FDIC at a judgment auction.12 See R. at 74 % 6. However, Aurora did not become a
shareholder of Liberty West until two years later, in April 1993, when it purportedly
foreclosed on the Liberty West stock. R. at 2901J 5.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Aurora raises three main arguments in its appeal, none of which is sufficient to
warrant reversal. First, Aurora claims that the trial court committed a legal error by
granting Defendants' motion to compel because the Second Set of Requests were served
with a single-digit typographical error, and therefore were not served in accordance with
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Aurora claims that the trial court
incorrectly determined that Aurora violated the order granting Defendants' motion to
compel. Third, assuming that Aurora fails on its first two arguments, Aurora contends
that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanctions of precluding it from
relying on certain evidence and dismissing its Second Amended Complaint.
Aurora's first argument is unavailing for a number of reasons, including, most
obviously, the fact that its counsel admitted to receiving the Second Set of Requests

" This was literally a few days after Liberty West's right of redemption on the property
had expired.

within a week of the date on which they were mailed, meaning that Aurora had plenty of
time to respond and suffered no prejudice. The fact that the error in the address wras a
minor typographical one, involving a single digit, also weighs heavily against this
argument. Aurora also waived this argument in any event by accepting numerous other
documents mailed to the same address.
Likewise, Aurora cannot prevail on its second argument. Not only was the order
granting Defendants' motion to compel entirely clear, the information subject to that
order was also obvious. Even so, Aurora refused to produce the documents and
information for another year following the filing of Defendants' sanctions motion.
Among the information Aurora refused to produce were the notes taken by Mr. Zak of
conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which Aurora first promised to provide to
Defendants on January 23, 2001, In light of the Supreme Court's opinion on whether
Aurora had standing to maintain its claims under the fraudulent concealment exception to
the contemporaneous ownership doctrine, this evidence was incredibly relevant to the
representations and/or omissions that were purportedly made to Aurora regarding the
Ogden Property and, therefore, crucial to Defendants' ability to mount a defense to
Aurora's claims. Aurora also refused to answer discovery requests regarding the
identification and nature of its claims, which was equally critical to Defendants' ability to
defend against Aurora's claims.
Finally, in light of well established Utah case law and Aurora's obstinate conduct
in this case, there is no question that the sanctions imposed by the trial court were just
and proper, and that no abuse of discretion occurred. The trial court had the benefit of

observing the conduct of the parties first hand, and there is ample support in the record
for its conclusions regarding Aurora's stubborn and persistent refusal to comply with the
court's Order. For these reasons, and as discussed more fully below, the judgment
entered against Aurora should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING THE MOTION TO COMPEL, INCLUDING BECAUSE
AURORA ADMITTED IT RECEIPTED THE DISCOVERY REQUESTS
The only argument Aurora raises to support its claim that the court improperly

granted Defendants' motion to compel is one that was soundly rejected by the trial court,
just as it should be by this Court. Simply. Aurora claims that the trial court should not
and could not have granted Defendants' motion to compel because Defendants did not
serve the Second Set of Requests in accordance with Rule 5(b)(1), which requires that
service be made upon a party's attorney by delivering or mailing a copy of the document
to the attorney's "last known address." UTAH R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). According to Aurora,
because Defendants did not mail the Second Set of Requests to its attorney's "last known
address," Aurora was not required to respond, and the trial court should (or could) not
have granted Defendants' motion to compel. Aurora's argument provides absolutely no
basis for reversal.
First, Aurora drastically overstates the error in the address to which the Second Set
of Requests was sent. The trivial typographical error consisted of a single incorrect digit
out of a four-digit number, i.e., what was meant to be 2558 was typed as 2258. This
minor error did not render the service ineffective and did not preclude the trial court from

reaching the merits of Defendants' motion to compel. Addressing a tax statute analogous
to Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which similarly requires sendee of
delinquency notices on taxpayers at their "last known address," 26 U.S.C. § 6121(b)(1),
courts have soundly rejected the same argument advanced by Aurora. Specifically, these
courts have held that minor errors in the taxpayer's address, like the minor error in this
case, do not affect the validity of the notice. See, e.g., In re Chabrand, 301 B.R. 468, 477
(S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that notice mailed to "2315 Silverado" rather than "2315
Silverado S." was effective); Carlyle v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2457 (1993)
(concluding that notice was effective where taxpayer received notice despite minor error
in spelling of street name); Riley v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1483 (1985)
(same).
Second, Aurora suffered no prejudice because it received actual notice of the
Second Set of Discovery Requests in plenty of time to respond. Aurora's counsel
admitted that he received the Second Set of Requests within "approximately one week
after they were purportedly mailed by defendants' counsel." See Affidavit of Eric P.
Hartman, R. at 1569 ^ 4. Since the Second Set of Requests was mailed on December 4,
2004, see R. at 1385, Aurora received it by December 11, 2002. This left Aurora with at
least three weeks to respond to the Second Set of Requests, whether by preparing
responses and objections, requesting an extension of time or filing a protective order.
Aurora did none of the above. Instead, on January710, 2003, six days after Aurora's
responses were due, Aurora's counsel pointedly informed Defendants that Aurora did not
intend to respond to the requests. See R. at 1478, 1454. Further, on January 16, 2003—

ten days after the responses were due and more than a month after the Second Set of
Requests was served—Aurora filed an untimely motion to strike the discovery on the
grounds that it conflicted with a prior order of the trial court. See R. at 1537.
What's more, Aurora did not even raise the issue of whether the requests were
properly served hi the motion to strike, instead waiting until January 27, 2003—nearly
two full months after the discovery was served—to raise the issue hi its opposition to
Defendants' motion to compel. See R. at 1576-79. By that time, Aurora had waived any
objection it might have had regarding the manner in which the discovery requests were
served. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Generally,... the
failure to object to interrogatories within the time fixed by Rule 33 . . . constitutes a
waiver of any objection.") (emphasis added); Land Ocean Logistics, Inc. v. Aqua Gulf
Corp., 181 F.R.D. 229, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Courts have held that a failure to respond
or object to a discovery request in a timely manner waives any objection which may have
been available") (emphasis added).
Third, courts routinely hold that actual notice or receipt of a discover}/ request is
sufficient to impose a duty to respond. For example, in a case where the plaintiff served
deposition notices on the defendant using an incorrect name, the court held that the
defendant was obligated to comply because he had actually received the documents and
thus "had notice that the plaintiff wished to take his deposition." Joujou Designs, Inc. v.
Jojo Ligne Internationale, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 1347, 1350 (N.D. Ca. 1996); see also Tong
Seae (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Edmar Corp., 81 B.R. 593 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (upholding
dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) where, once defendant received actual notice of the

district court's discover}7 order, it was no longer justified in refusing to respond to
discovery). Similarly, here there is no question that Aurora received the discovery
requests, had actual notice, and was therefore obligated to respond.
Although no Utah case has addressed the precise issue in this case, Utah Courts
are in unanimous agreement with this principle. In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals
applied a similar rationale in Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D. T. Southern Properties,
838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), where it held that a party's failure to serve a
copy of a default judgment as required by the rules "does not invalidate the default
judgment." The Court explained:
Notwithstanding the argument that [plaintiffs] failed to give notice,
[defendant] received notice of the default judgment on July 18, 1990, when
he was personally served with the court's order in supplemental
proceedings. This notice, which [defendant] received approximately seven
weeks after the court entered default judgment, provided him adequate
opportunity to timely move to set aside the default judgment.
Id. (affirming trial court's denial of motion to set aside default judgment). Certainly, the
timely service of a set of discovery requests at an address with a minor, single-digit
typographical error should receive commensurate treatment, especially in light of
Aurora's admission that it received the requests within a week of the mailing date.
Fourth, because Aurora previously accepted sendee at the incorrect address, it was
estopped from claiming the sendee was ineffective. Aurora received the Second Set of
Discovery Requests in ample time to respond, and Aurora had previously received
sendee of documents and pleadings that contained the same typographical error in the
address. For instance, Aurora made no objection to the service of Defendants' motion to

compel, which was mailed to the same address. See R. at 1536. The same is true of the
sendee of Defendants' (1) Notice of Substitution of Counsel, see R. at1319-1321; (2) Ex
Parte Motion for Order Substituting Counsel, see R. at 1329-1331; (3) Ex Parte Motion
for Extension of Time to Respond to Outstanding Discovery, see R. at 1326-1328: and
(4) Defendants5 Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents, see R. at 1382-83, all of which were mailed to the
address containing the same typographical error. As a consequence, Aurora had a duty to
respond to the Second Set of Requests, and it waived any objection it may have had to the
service thereof.
Fifth, none of the cases upon which Aurora relies advances its position. For
example, Aurora cites New York Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5 Cir.
1996) in support of its assertion that Defendants' sendee of the Second Set of Requests at
the wrong address is "fatally defective." Appellant's Br. at 16. This is a vast
overstatement. The New York Life opinion does not so hold and is readily distinguishable
from this case. In New York Life, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's refusal to set aside a summary judgment because the defendant had never
received a copy of the motion for summary judgment and because the clerk of the court
mailed the motion to an address that it knew or should have known was invalid. See id.
at 142. Because the defendant had been entirely deprived of "the opportunity to be
heard," the summary judgment was void on constitutional due process grounds. Id. at
143.

In this case, by contrast, Aurora received actual notice of the Second Set of
Requests in plenty of time to take action and, in fact, Aurora did take action by belatedly
filing a motion to strike. Indeed, the trial court considered the merits of Aurora's motion
despite its untimely filing, and so Aurora certainly was not deprived of its "right to be
heard." Moreover, there is a substantial difference in consequences arising from the
documents of which the parties claim not to have received notice—whereas in New York
Life the defendant was not notified of a motion for entry of an actual judgment, resulting
a denial of due process, in this case Aurora claims not to have received a set of discovery,
which it actually did receive.
Aurora also mistakenly relies on J.D. Pharmaceutical Distributors, Inc. v. SaveOn Drugs & Cosmetics Corp., 893 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1990) to support its claim that the
"improper" sendee of the Second Set of Requests was fatal. Appellant's Br. at 16. The
trial court in that case had entered summary judgment against each of two defendants
(among others) on the basis of their failure to respond to the plaintiffs requests for
admission. See J.D. Pharmaceutical, 893 F.2d at 1203. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment as to one of the defendants, but
affirmed with respect to the other. See id. at 1208-1209. The court held that the entry of
summary judgment against the first defendant was improper because the record showed
that she never received notice of either the requests for admissions or the motion for
summary judgment. See id. at 1208. On the other hand, the court held that the summary
judgment against the second defendant was proper because he had actually received both
the requests for admission and the motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1208-09.

The court's reasoning was sound. Like Aurora, the second defendant in J.D.
Pharmaceutical was not prevented from responding—he shnply elected not to do so. See
id. at 1209. Thus, J.D. Pharmaceutical supports Defendants' position—because Aurora
received actual notice of the Second Set of Requests, it was obligated to respond, and its
failure to do so justified the trial court's grant of Defendants' motion to compel.
Aurora's reliance upon Timmons v. United States, 194 F.2d 357 (4m Cir. 1952),
and United States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163 (D. Mont. 1948), is similarly misplaced. Like
J.D. Pharmaceutical, both Timmons and Brandt involve the entry of judgment against
parties who failed to respond to requests for admission. The Timmons court affirmed the
entry of judgment against the defendant, despite her claim that she never received the
requests for admission, because the requests were served by mail in accordance with the
rules. See Timmons, 194 F.2d at 359. In contrast, the Brandt court reversed the entry of
summary judgment against the defendants because there was no proof that they had
actually received the requests for admission, and the certificate of service failed to
specify the address to which the requests were mailed. See Brandt, 8 F.R.D. at 165-66.
Due to Aurora's admission that it actually received the Second Set of Requests, this case
is clearly much more like Timmons than Brandt. The judgment against Aurora should
accordingly be affirmed.
Both Bjorlin v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1950), and Merchants'
Groceiy Co. v. Merchants' Trust & Banking Co., 80 So. 494 (Miss. 1919), also fail to
support Aurora's assertion that it was not required to respond to the Second Set of
Requests. In Bjorlin, the court refused to compel the defendant to produce the names and

address of witnesses to an accident on the basis that no interrogatories were served at all,
see id. at 43, whereas in this case the motion to compel was granted only after Aurora
failed to respond to the Second Set of Requests it actually received. Merchants Groceiy
is similarly inapposite. The case, which is based upon an outdated rule of civil procedure
in effect in Mississippi in 1919, held simply that an out-of-state defendant had no
obhgation to respond to interrogatories that were served on its attorney because the rule,
at the time, required an affidavit of service by a sheriff, constable or marshal, which did
not occur in that case. Id. at 494. No similar issue exists in this case.
Finally, Aurora relies on Southland Construction v. Semnani, 2001 UT 6, 20 P.3d
875, for the proposition that "sendee must rigorously conform to the rules to be a valid
basis on which a court may act." Appellant's Br. at 16. Unfortunately for Aurora, the
proposition for which Southland Conswuction stands is not nearly so broad as it claims.
Similarly to the New York Life case discussed above, Southland Construction deals with
the entry of a default judgment, not a motion to compel, and with the service of a
summons, not a set of discovery. Southland Constr., 2001 UT 6, atfflj4-5. As a result,
the court's reversal of the default judgment in Southland Construction simply does not
call for a similar result in this case.
In sum, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion to compel because
Aurora timely received the Second Set of Bequests but willfully elected not to respond.

II.

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT AURORA VIOLATED THE COURT'S
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
Aurora claims the trial court's entry of sanctions against it was improper because

it did not violate the April 8, 2003 Order (the "Order") granting Defendants' motion to
compel. According to Aurora, the Order did not actually require it to provide any
substantive information or to produce any actual documents; instead, the Order only
required Aurora to file a written "response" setting forth its objections to the Second Set
of Requests. See Appellant's Br. at 22-23. This position is indefensible. D
A.

Aurora Had More than Adequate Notice of What the Order Required

Aurora first argues that the Order was insufficiently specific for it to determine
because it did not put Aurora on notice that any substantive, specific responses to the
Second Set of Requests were required. Aurora further claims that at the March 26, 2003
hearing on the motion to compel did not shed any light on its obligations, because "the
court was primarily deciding whether to allow defendants to conduct further discovery at
all. No ruling was made as to the propriety of specific discovery requests." Appellant's
Br. at 23. Aurora grossly lnischaracterizes the record in making this claim.
First, the Order itself is clear and unequivocal. It states that that Defendants'
motion to compel was "granted," and that Aurora's motion to strike the Second Set of

lj

Aurora also suggests that, in light of the trial court's earlier statement that it would
appoint a special master, the court's decision to address the motion to compel itself,
rather than appointing a special master, was somehow improper. Aurora cites no legal
authority to support this position, because there is none. A trial court certainly has no
obligation to inform the parties of its intention to address directly any particular motion in
the proceedings, and is certainly entitled to remove any matter from a special master that
it deems appropriate.

Discovery was "denied." R. at 1751. Plainly, this means that Aurora was required to
respond to the Second Set of Requests in accordance with the relief requested by
Defendants in their motion to compel, and that Aurora was not relieved of this duty by
virtue of its motion to strike.
Second, the context in which the order was entered, along with the contents of the
motion to compel, confirms this simple interpretation. "The specificity of an order is a
question of fact that must be evaluated in the context and setting in which it was entered.
Thus, to determine the clarity of an order, the court should first examine the
circumstances in which it was entered." United States v. Cable News Network, Inc., 865
F. Supp. 1549, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994). In this instance, the motion to compel addressed at
least two specific categories of hiformation, both of which were also specifically
addressed at the March 26, 2003 hearing on the motion to compel.14 Accordingly, there
is no question that Aurora was required to provide this information at a minimum.
The first specific category of information sought by the motion to compel was
copies of notes taken by Aurora's president, Charles N. Zak, of conversations he had with
Mr. Gay and others sometime following Aurora's acquisition of a security interest in Mr.
Hogle's Liberty7 West stock. See R. at 1481, 1654-55. Mr. Zak referred to these notes in
his deposition on January 23, 2001, and, at the same deposition, Aurora's counsel
promised to produce the notes, albeit in redacted form if necessary. See R. at 1532-1533

14

Defendants had earlier also moved to compel Aurora to supply a complete copy of the
first set of documents it had earlier produced in the case, because Defendants counsel had
been unable to locate them in the files received from prior counsel. Despite its promise
to do so, see, e.g., R. at 1481, 1529, Aurora also failed to produce these documents.

("I think we'd be happy to go through these and black out anyihmg that would be under
attorney/client privilege and so forth, and provide you with the rest."). Indeed,
Defendants' ability to present a defense was seriously compromised by Aurora's refusal
to provide these notes, which were clearly relevant to—and may have been the only
documentary evidence on—the crucial issue of whether Aurora had standing under the
fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See, e.g., R.
at 3348. pp. 8-9, 53. Despite Defendants' request for and Aurora's counsel's promise to
provide these notes at Mr. Zak's deposition in 200, despite the promise to provide the
notes to Defendants' counsel in the Fall of 2002. despite Defendants' request for the
notes in the Second Set of Requests in 2002, and despite the pointed and express
discussion of the notes in Defendants' motion to compel and at the March 26, 2003
healing on that motion. Aurora still maintains that it did not know it was required to
produce these notes. This claim is both disingenuous and totally implausible.
The second category of information addressed in the motion to compel was
information and documents sufficient to clarify and identify Aurora's causes of action
against Defendants, and the bases for the claims. See R. at 1481: R. at 1529; R. at 165455. Due to a lack of clarity in Aurora's complaint. Defendants were unable specifically
to identify certain of Aurora's claims and had therefore requested that Aurora identify its
claims, the elements of the claims and any supporting evidence. Defendants first made
this request in 2002 by telephone, and Aurora's counsel agreed to provide the
information. See R. at 1529: R. at 3347. p. 12. Defendants confirmed this request in a
subsequent letter, see R. at 1529, but Aurora still did not provide the information.

Defendants then formalized the request in the Second Set of Requests in late 2002, see R.
at 1506-09, and then moved to compel the information in 2003. See R. at 1475.
Defendants discussed this request extensively in the motion to compel and at the March
26, 2003 hearing. See R. at 1501, 1512; R. at 3347, pp. 12-13. As a result, Defendants'
request for clarification and identification of Aurora's claims was clearly a subject of the
Order, and Aurora was well aware of the issue.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated, in a case cited, ironically, by Aurora, "[t]his is
not a case where a confused and unassisted layman wras thrown out of the courthouse
simply for missing a discovery deadline." Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. Osguthorpe, 892
P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1995). Because there is no sense in which Aurora can claim that it lacked
notice of what information and documents it was required to provide, the Order was
sufficiently specific to have been violated by Aurora.
B.

The Trial Court Correcth Determined that Aurora Violated the Order
by Refusing to Produce, Among Other Things, Mr. Zak's Notes and
Information Sufficient to Identify Aurora's Claims

It is equally clear that Aurora violated the Order. Aurora's argument with respect
to this point is that the "response'' it served to the Second Set of Requests on May 7,
2003, was adequate to comply with the Order. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 25.
However, not only did Aurora's "response" come long after the due date for
Aurora's responses to the Second Set of Requests, and after the court granted
Defendants' motion to compel, but also the "response" provided almost no information in
response to Defendants' interrogatories and refused to produce any of the requested
documents—including the information specifically addressed in the motion to compel.

Instead, the "response" merely asserted a litany of objections without providing any
substantive information whatsoever. See R. at 1936-1954.
Aurora ineffectually argues that the trial court's denial of Defendants' motion to
expedite Aurora's discovery responses, which was filed after the court granted
Defendants' motion to compel, shows that its "response" to the Second Set of Requests
was sufficient. According to this argument, because the motion to expedite asked the
court to rule that Aurora had waived its objections to the Second Set of Requests, and
because the court denied the motion, Aurora was not only entitled to object to the
requests but also was not required to provide any substantive information in response to
the requests. Appellants Br. at 20-21, 24-25. However, because the court's disposition
of the motion to expedite did not address Aurora's right to assert objections to the Second
Set of Requests, it certainly was not dispositive of the issue.15 Moreover, even if Aurora
were correct that the trial court permitted it to make its objections to the Second Set of
Requests, which is highly debatable, Aurora's ability to object surely did not relieve it
from providing at least the particular information at the heart of the dispute.
For example, Aurora's responses to Defendants' document requests for
information regarding Mi*. Zak's communications with Mr. Gay and others, including the
notes relevant to the fraudulent concealment objection, were particularly evasive. In
response to the request seeking documents referring to Mr. Gay and his associates, for
instance, Aurora simply objected to the requests as "overbroad and unduly burdensome,"
" In fact, Defendants filed the motion primarily in an effort to meet the trial court's sixtyday deadline for completion of discovery, and in an effort to obtain Ivlr. Zalc's notes prior
to his deposition. See R. at 1740-44.

and otherwise completely refused to respond. See R. at 1950. In response to the more
specific request for the notes referred to by Mi". Zak in his deposition. Aurora asserted
that all such documents were subject to the work product doctrine. See R. at 1952.
Counsel for Aurora raised the work product objection again at the hearing on the motion
for sanctions:
THE COURT: Why haven't you delivered them?
MR. HARTMAN: Because we objected to it, your honor.
THE COURT: Right. But on what basis? You have no right to object to
them, on what basis can you object to it?
MR. HARTMAN: Because they are work product.
THE COURT: Work product? You're talking about the notes of a
conversation between the plaintiff and the defendant and you're claiming
they're work product somehow?
MR. HARTMAN: Sure. They are—they are prepared in anticipation of
litigation, your Honor. The—the fact that defendants have—have stated
that—
THE COURT: Conversations between a plaintiff and a defendant, your
argument to me is that they're work product?
MR. HARTMAN: The notes—
THE COURT: That's your argument?
MR. HARTMAN: The notes of those conversation^] are work product.
They are—they—they qualify, because they're—they are documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation. . . . But furthermore, the important
thing is that those notes are totally irrelevant because—
R. at 3348, p. 34. As indicated, the court clearly rejected this argument, and the trial
court's justified frustration with Aurora's specious position on this issue is apparent.

Similarly, with respect to Defendants' interrogatory requesting identification of
Aurora's claims and supporting evidence. Aurora objected "on the grounds that it is a
pure question of law and outside the scope of Discovery under Rule 26." See R. at 1941.
Aurora provided no other information or response to this interrogatory. Indeed, Aurora
still claims that it made proper objections to and answered these requests in full by
referring Defendants to "numerous previous discovery responses in which it had provided
such information to defendants." Appellant's Br. at 26. As the trial court found,
Aurora's refusal to identify its claims and the bases its claims was inadequate to comply
with the Order. See R. at 3261.
Aurora's refusal to provide responsive information and documents constituted a
clear violation of the Order. It is well established that a failure to provide discovery need
not be absolute to justify the imposition of sanctions. "No finding of a 'complete failure'
to comply with discovery is required. Indeed, dismissal as a discovery sanction has been
upheld for late or incomplete discovery responses." Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75,
\ 18, 999 P.2d 588. Rule 37 and applicable case law provide ample support for this
standard:
Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of
this subdivision, an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer or response is
to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3); see also Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 571 (concluding that trial court
did not abuse discretion in ruling that defendant violated discovery order by providing
incomplete disclosures of expert witnesses).

In this case, as the trial court explained in its minute entry on the motion for
sanctions,
[w]hile the court recognizes that on May 75 2003 Aurora served defendant
with 'written responses,' such responses were wholly inadequate.
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation
imperative to defendants' defense.
R. at 3261, n.l (emphasis added). The trial court further explained its ruling as follows:
On April 8, 2003 this court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its
Order, the Court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora credit to respond to
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff failed to do so. To this day, Aurora
Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to provide
defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its defense of
this case: the handwritten notes of President Charles F. Zak, Aurora's First
Document Production, notes of Charles Zak regarding conversations with
James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson, relevant documents
taken from Liberty West Development by a former employee, and
identification of and basis for the claims alleged.
R. at 3261 (emphasis added).
In light of Aurora's refusal to produce the notes and other information requested
by Defendants, and as ordered by the court, the court correctly concluded that Aurora
violated the Order, and the judgment should be affirmed.
IH.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCOVERY SANCTIONS WERE
COMMENSURATE ^TTH AURORA'S CONDUCT AND WITHIN THE
COURT'S DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
Finally, Aurora claims the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the

discovery sanctions of precluding Aurora from relying upon certain evidence at trial and
strildng its Second Amended Complaint. See Appellant's Br. at 30-31. However, the

sanctions in this case were proportionate to Aurora's conduct, and the trial court did not
act outside of its discretion.
Under Utah law, the imposition of discovery sanctions requires a threshold
showing of "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the
judicial process." Morton, 938 P.2d at 274 (emphasis added). "To support a finding of
willfuhiess, there need only be 'any intentional failure as distmguished from involuntary
noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown.'" Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999UTApp
127, \ 15, 981 P.2d 407 (quoting Ogusthorpe, 892 P.2d at 8). Once the threshold
determination is made, however, u[t]he choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is
primarily the responsibility of the trial judge." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also Hales, 200 UT App 75, % 18 ("Once this initial determination is made.
the full range of options for sanctions under Rule 37 is available, and the trial court has
broad discretion to select which sanction to apply in the circumstances."). This is
because the trial court, which has lived first hand with the case and counsel—in this case
for many years—is in the best position to determine what sanctions will be effective:
Because the trial judge deals directly with the parties and the discovery
process, he or she has great latitude in detennining the most efficient and
fair manner to conduct the court's business. As a result, trial courts have
broad discretion in determining whether a violation of a scheduling order
warrants sanction.
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87. % 36, 977
P.2d 518 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Aurora's assertion, there is substantial record evidence to support the
trial court's threshold finding that Aurora willfully violated the Order and otherwise

engaged in dilatory behavior. Indeed, prior to Defendants' motion to compel, Aurora
informed Defendants counsel that it did not intend to respond and would not respond to
the Second Set of Requests, forcing Defendants to move to compel. See R. at 1478.
Even after the motion to compel was granted, Aurora continued its willful refusal to
provide the requested information, and it still failed to provide any information during the
nearly year-long period between Defendants' motion for sanctions on May 22, 2003, and
the court's disposition of the motion at the hearing on May 5, 2004. R. at 3348. As
discussed above, Aurora did not provide any responsive information in its purported
"response," despite the court's clear Order.
Additionally, rather than simply responding to the Second Set of Requests, Aurora
filed a motion to strike, see R. at 1539; a motion for a protective order to delay the
deposition of Mr. Zak, see R. at 1798; a motion to appoint a special master, see R. at
1790; and a motion to toll the discover)7 deadlines pending resolution of the discovery
issues by the special master. See R. 1803. These motions, the first of which was filed
after the filing of Defendant's motion to compel, and the latter three of which were filed
after the issuance of the Order granting Defendants' motion to compel, are more than
sufficient to support the conclusion that Aurora acted willfully and engaged in tactics
intended to delay the proceedings and waste judicial resources.
Moreover, there was no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court's
sanctions. As Utah courts have repeatedly noted, trial courts have broad discretion in
imposing discovery sanctions under Rule 37 because they are the ones who "deal first

hand with the parties and the discover)7 process." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 6 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). For that reason.
[a] trial court's abuse of discretion in selecting which sanction to impose
may be shown "only if there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling."
Tuck, 1999 UT App 127, ^ 15 (quoting Morton, 938 P.2d at 274) (emphasis added).
Aurora claims that the trial court's initial determination that the sendee of the
Second Set of Requests was the "erroneous conclusion of law" that led it to improperly
grant the motion to compel and later enter sanctions against it. As discussed above,
however, this argument is completely lacking in merit, as is the argument that the court
erred in determining that Aurora violated the Order.
Aurora's intransigence, and its refusal to take "no" for an answer, also
demonstrate the propriety of the sanctions chosen by the trial court. Appellate courts
routinely uphold discovery sanctions like those in this case for similar or far less
egregious behavior. See, e.g., Morton, 938 P.2d at 276 (relied upon by Aurora)
(reinstating trial court's dismissal of action where the plaintiff willfully failed to compfy
with discovery order); Ogusthorpe, 892 P.2d at 7 (relied upon by Aurora) (upholding
dismissal of action where defendant willfully and repeatedly failed to respond to
discover)' and other motions); see also W. W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village,
568 P.2d at 736-37 (Utah 1997) (affirming default judgment against party who failed to
answer interrogatories, even though the party attempted to serve the responses just prior
to sanctions hearing); Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Sen\ Comm n, 2002 UT App 254, ^J
14, 53 P.3d 11 (affirming dismissal for plaintiffs failure to comply with repeated

discoveiy requests, even though no discovery order had been entered); Schoney v.
Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 584-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (upholding default
judgment despite party's tender of responses at hearing on sanctions); Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming default against party
who failed to meet discovery deadlines and only partly responded to motion to compel).
Like the courts in all of these cases, this Court should conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
Because the record supports the trial court's findings of Aurora's willfulness and
dilatory behavior, and because the sanctions of dismissal and evidence preclusion were
proportionate to Aurora's abuse of the process, the trial court's imposition of sanctions
and the resulting judgment should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to
affirm the trial court's entry of the final judgment in this matter.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of June, 2005.

MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
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Rule 5- Service and filing of pleadings and other papers,
(a) Service: When required.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by the court,
every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to discovery, every written
motion other than one heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties.
(a)(2) No service need be made on parties in default except that:
(a)(2)(A) a party in default shall be served as ordered by the court;
(a)(2)(B) a party in default for any reason other than for failure to appear shall be served
with all pleadings and papers;
(a)(2)(C) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of any hearing
necessary to determine the amount of damages to be entered against the defaulting party;
(a)(2)(D) a party in default for any reason shall be served with notice of entry of
judgment under Rule 58A(d); and
(a)(2)(E) pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief against a party in default
for any reason shall be served in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
(a)(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment,
garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named as defendant, any
service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be
made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its
seizure.
(b) Service: How made and by whom.
(b)(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a
party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney unless
service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party
shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address or, if
no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court.
(b)(1)(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the
party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person in charge thereof; or, if
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is
closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house

or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein; or, if consented to in writing by the person to be served, delivering a copy by
electronic or other means.
(b)(1)(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice of a
hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or lessfromthe date of service, service
shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. Service by electronic means is
complete on transmission if transmission is completed during normal business hours at
the place receiving the service; otherwise, service is complete on the next business day.
(b)(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court:
(b)(2)(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or a
judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it;
(b)(2)(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall be served
by the party preparing it; and
(b)(2)(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the court.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there is an unusually large
number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative, may order that
service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as
between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or
avoided by all other parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof
upon the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed
with the court either before or within a reasonable time after service. The papers shall be
accompanied by a certificate of service showing the date and manner of service
completed by the person effecting service. Rule 26(i) governs the filing of papers related
to discovery.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except
that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit
them to the office of the clerk.
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Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable notice to other
parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as
follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be made to the court in
which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the
district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent
who is not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken.
(2) Motion.
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party may
move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the
party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or
31, or a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or
31(a), or a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the
discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an
order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the
person or party failing to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or
material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before applying for
an order.
(3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response. For purposes of this
subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a
failure to disclose, answer, or respond.
(4) Expenses and sanctions.
(A) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after
the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or
deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the motion was

filed without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or
discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or
objection was substantially justified, or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under
Rule 26(c) and shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving party or the
attorney or both of them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the
reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective
order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after opportunity for hearing, apportion the
reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a
just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a deponent fails to be
sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in
which the deposition is being taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that
court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify
on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an
order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated
facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the
order is obeyed, dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party;

(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating as a
contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to submit to a physical or
mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a), such orders as are
listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
comply is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall require the
party failing to obey the order or the attorney or both of them to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any
document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth
of the matter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof,
including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that (1)
the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought
was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground
to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the
failure to admit.
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to interrogatories or
respond to request for inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party
fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with
a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper service of the request, the
court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs
(A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition
thereto, the court shall require the party failing to act or the party's attorney or both to pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the ground that the
discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to act has applied for a
protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).

(e) Failure to participate in theframingof a discovery plan. If a party or attorney fails to
participate in good faith in theframingof a discovery plan by agreement as is required by
Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing, require such party or attorney to
pay to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the
failure.
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as
required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document
or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the
court may order any other sanction, including payment of reasonable costs and attorney
fees, any order permitted under subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of
the failure to disclose.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES
Plaintiff,

:

MEMORAM3tftTOTCISTO^
Case No. 940904935
Judge L. A. DEVER

v.

:
:
:

LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, et al.

:

Date: August 1,2002

Defendant.

:

This matter is before the Court on defendants Dennis M. Gay's and XM International's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 4-501. After hearing oral argument
on May 2, 2002, the Court took these matters under advisement. Having considered the argument of the
parties, and the Motions and the Memoranda submitted thereby, the Court enters the following decision:

Motion for Summary Judgment
This action regards interest in stock in the now defunct Liberty West Development, and the events
surrounding the loss of Liberty West's primary asset, an office complex located in Ogden, Utah. In
defendants' first attempt to obtain summary judgment in this case, addressed on appeal in Aurora Credit
Services, Inc., v, Liberty West Development, Inc., etal, 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998), the Supreme Court made clear
that because the undisputed facts reveal Plaintiff acquired no interest in Liberty West Development until after
the arguably actionable events occurred, Plaintiff could recover both directly and derivatively only if it could
demonstrate that the fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule applies.
Specifically the Court stated: "we will allow a noncontemporaneous shareholder to bring a derivative suit
if he or she can show (i) that the corporation fraudulently concealed wrongdoing from shareholders and (ii)
that a reasonable shareholder would not have discovered the wrongdoing earlier." Id at 1279 (emphasis added).
In reversing this Court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court held that the consideration under
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the second prong, under the circumstances of this case, required the trier of fact to consider whether it would
have been reasonable for the plaintiff to take certain actions which would have led to the discovery of the
cause of action earlier than it was discovered. The Court did not address the first prong as it was assumed
satisfied for purposes of that motion.
Defendants now seek summary judgment based upon the first prong analysis, under the theory that
because Dennis M. Gay, James Hogle, Jr., and the other two individuals that formed Liberty West were the
only stockholders at all relevant times to plaintiffs causes of action, and because these shareholders knew of
the alleged wrongdoing at the time it occurred, plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of the first prong of
the exception. Defendants forward a second argument, which is that because plaintiffs shares were ultimately
obtained from Hogle, plaintiff may only assert the rights which Hogle could have asserted while he was a
shareholder, and because he knew of the alleged wrongdoing and consented to it, neither he, nor plaintiff, his
successor in interest, may now be heard to object. Plaintiff argues that because the parties disagree on who
was the "shareholder" at the time of the wrongdoing, there is an issue of fact which precludes summary
judgment.
While circumstances may arise requiring specific analysis regarding whether the holder of a security
interest in stock (such as the FDIC and Aurora, prior to the April 1993 foreclosure) would be entitled to
maintain a shareholder's derivative action under the fraudulent concealment exception to the
contemporaneous ownership doctrine, such analysis is unnecessary in this case. Facts stated in the Supreme
Court's decision are controlling:
On January 8, 1992, the FDIC executed a formal assignment to Aurora of its interest in the
Hogle judgment, including its security interest in Hogle's LWD stock. Aurora notified LWD
and Gay of its acquisition of the security interest on January 20, 1992. Aurora foreclose J on
the security in the Hogle stock in April of 1993.
From the time the FDIC acquired the interest in the Hogle judgment and through early July
1993, after it had been assigned to Aurora, LWD represented first to the FDIC and then to
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Aurora that it owned and was trying to sell the Ogden property. . . . However, after May of
1991 these and other statements were no longer true.
Id. at 1276.

Regardless of what interest the FDIC and Aurora, prior to foreclosure held, these facts

demonstrate that at least a question for the finder of fact exists whether "affirmative steps to conceal
wrongdoing" from plaintiff were undertaken from April 1993 until July 7,1993. Unlike the continuing harm
exception, which will not lie when the harm is complete prior to a plaintiff's ownership of interest {see Id. at
1278), the fraudulent concealment exception, as it has been framed by the Supreme Court, would appear to
apply even when the concealment occurs after the harm is complete. Accordingly, plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is D E N I E D .

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
Based upon the plaintiffs failure to timely object to the adequacy of the defendants' supplemental
answers, under this Court's June 28, 2000 Order, the answers to the plaintiffs first discovery requests were
deemed complete.

The Court interprets the initial discovery requests as asking for certain specific

information, which was provided to the apparent satisfaction of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, to the extent that
responses called for by the plaintiffs current discovery requests would contain information which is precisely
duplicative of the information given in response to, or specifically requested by the first discover}* requests,
such information need not be provided. Except as provided herein, plaintiffs Motion to Compel is hereby
G R A N T E D . Defendants are hereby ordered to supplement their answers to the second set of interrogatories.
Any supplemental responses to which plaintiff does not object within 14 days of the service will be deemed
complete.
This constitutes the final order of the Court on the matters referenced herein. N o further order need
be prepared.
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Attorneys for Defendants XM International, LLC and Dennis W. Gay
LN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
LN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a
Minnesota corporation,
I

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,

Civil No.: 940904935
Honorable Leon A. Dever

Defendants.

On Wednesday, March 26, 2003, at approximately 11:00 a.m., the Court heard argument
on various matters presented by the parties. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora")
was represented by Eric P. Hartman, Esq. Defendants XM International, LLC and Dennis W.
Gay were represented by James E. Magleby, Esq. The Court heard argument on Defendants'
Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. The Court also heard argument as to whether

counsel for Defendants Dennis W. Gay and XM International, LLC, the law firm of Miller
Magleby &Guymon, P.C. (and its predecessor counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll,
LLP), effectively withdrew as counsel of record for Defendant Liberty West Development, Inc.
("LWD"), or, in the alternative, whether counsel may be allowed to withdraw, if the Notice of
Withdrawal was not automatically effective. Finally, the Court heard argument on Plaintiffs
Objection to Adequacy of Defendants' Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs Second Set of
Interrogatories and Request for Document of Documents and the Addendum to Plaintiffs
Objection to Adequacy of Defendants' Supplementary Discovery Responses, the latter of which
was submitted on March 25, 2003.
Based upon the papers submitted by the parties, the pleadings and papers on file with the
Court, the arguments presented by counsel, and for good cause shown, the Court hereby
ORDERS as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is
DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. will respond to Defendants'
Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff, and Defendants' Second Set of Requests
for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days from Masn 26?
2003. Each party is to bear its own attorney fees and costs.

2.

If discovery disputes remain between the parties thirty-five (35) days after"WEB Hi
4&, 2003, then on the thirty-fifth day the Court shall appoint a Special Master to
preside over all pre-trial discovery disputes. In the event a Special Master is

appointed, the Plaintiff and the Defendants will share the cost for the Special

3.

Discovery shall be completed sixty (60) days from March 26, 2003.

DATED this ^ day of April 2003.
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ric P. Hartman, Esq.
^-So
Eric
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc.

ufet^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am an employee of the law firm of Miller Magleby & Guymon,
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that pursuant to Rule
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
delivered to the following on March 26, 2003, and again on April 7, 2003, by:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile No.
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

Eric P. Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Facsimile: (801) 467-6691
Attorney for Aurora Credit Services, Inc.
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CASE NO. 940904935
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,

JUDGE LA. DEVER

Defendants.

The Court has before it a request for decision in connection with several pending
motions, including: 1) Defendants' Motion For Rule 37 Sanctions; 2) Defendants'
Motion To Dismiss; and 3) Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment. Oral
arguments were heard on May 5, 2004 after which the Court took the matter under
advisement.
On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion To
Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion To Strike. Consistent with its Order, the Court
explicitly required plaintiff Aurora Credit to respond to defendants' second set of

Aurora Credit v. Liberty West
et. al.
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Minute Entry

interrogatories and second set of requests for production of documents within thirty (30)
days, with discovery to be completed within sixty (60) days. Plaintiff failed to do so.1 To
this day, Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to provide
defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its defense of this case:
the handwritten notes of President Charles F Zak, Aurora's First Document Production,
notes of Charles Zak regarding conversations with James Hogle, Tony Veersteeg and
Lonnie Anderson, relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a
former employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged.
As a result of Aurora Credit blatant and willful disregard of the Court's Order, this
Court concludes, in reliance upon the discretionary powers granted to it pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37, that severe sanctions are warranted. See, Tuck v
Godfrey 981 P.1d 407, 412 (Utah App 1999)(citing, Morton v Continental Bank 938
P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997)) (if sanctions warranted, trial judge to determine appropriate
sanction).
For these reasons the Court hereby enters the following sanctions against Aurora
Credit:
1. A Preclusion Order is entered, excluding Aurora from relying upon any
evidence which it refused to provide through discovery. Specifically, the

]

While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants with
"written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate. Additionally, Aurora
refused to produce the requested documentation imperative to defendants' defense.

Aurora Credit v. Liberty West
et al.
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alleged conversations between Charles Zak and Dennis Gay as reflected
in the handwritten notes of Charles Zak.
2. Aurora's Second Amended Complaint is stricken due to Aurora's refusal to
identify its claims and provide any evidence in support thereof.
Due to plaintiffs egregious disregard for the Court's prior ruling, the Court enters the
above noted dispositive sanctions thereby making it unnecessary to address the
remaining motions.
Defendants' counsel to prepare an Order consistent with this Minute Entry for
submission to the Court.

Dated this

/

BY THE COURT:

day of May, 2004.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MINUTE
ENTRY, to the following, this_£_ Day of_ _''»>_ P ?
r

u
James Magleby
Miller, Magleby & Guymon
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 841014
Eric Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

j

., 2004:
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LN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a
Minnesota corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, LLC a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,

Civil No.: 940904935
Honorable Leon A. Dever

Defendants.

On Monday, May 5, 2004. the Court hear argument on the following motions:
Defendants' Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions; (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and
(3) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Plamtiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. ("Aurora") was
represented by Eric P. Hartman, Esq. Defendants Liberty West Development, Inc., XM
International LLC and Dennis W. Gay (collectively, "Defendants") were represented by James
E. Magleby, Esq, of MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON, P.C.

The Court ruled by way of a Minute Entry signed on May 9, 2004 (the "Minute Entry").
Based upon the papers submitted by the parties, the pleadings and papers on file with the Court,
the arguments presented by counsel, the reasons set forth in the Minute Entry, and for good cause
shown, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Rule 37 Sanctions is GRANTED, as follows:
a. The Court hereby enters a preclusion order, excluding Plaintiff from using or
relying upon any testimony relating to the alleged conversations between
Plaintiffs President, Charles Zak, and Defendant Dennis W. Gay.
b. The Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, due to
Aurora's failure to identify its claims and evidence in support thereof.

•8*
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The remaining iss&o&ktmRoiS^

motionc are rendered moot by the

Court's Minute Entry and this Order, and so the Court does not address those
issues.
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DATED this \_\V
day of
y day
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/2>004.
! THIRD JUDICIAL

Honor;
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Eric P. Hartman, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc.
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CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MILLER MAGLEBY & GUYMON,
P.C., 170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that pursuant to Rule
5(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
delivered to the following on the

day of

2004 by:

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile No.
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

James E. Magleby
MILLER MAGLEBY

Eric P. Hartman
2558 South

& GUYMON, P.C.

Wilshire Circle

S a l t L a k e Cl

170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

AURORA CREDIT SERVICES, INC., a
Minnesota corporation
Plaintiff,
ORDER
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V.

CASE NO. 940904935
LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation, XM
INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company, and DENNIS W. GAY,
an individual,
,

JUDGE L.A. DEVER

Defendants.

On July 13, 2004 this Court issued an order imposing sanctions against plaintiff
Aurora Credit Services based upon their "blatant and willful disregard" of the Court's
previous Orders. Aurora has now filed a motion requesting that the Court's Order
imposing sanctions be altered or amended.
Upon consideration of Aurora's pleadings, the Court concludes that plaintiffs
claims were previously rejected by this Court, and that the current motion merely
represents Aurora's attempt to re-address old issues and arguments. Accordingly,
Aurora's Motion To Amend is hereby denied.

Aurora Credit v. Liberty West
Development
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This is the Court's final Order.

Dated this

*^

day of November, 2004.

BY THE COURU

DISTRICT

Order

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, to the
following, thisjO Day of U

Jw.

Eric P Hartman
2558 South Wilshire Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
James E Magleby
Miller Magleby & Guymon
170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

, 2004:

